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Abstract: A quantum digital signature scheme based on quantum
mechanics is proposed in this paper. The security of the protocol relies
on the existence of quantum one-way functions by fundamental quantum
principles. Our protocol involves a so-called arbitrator who validates and
authenticates the signed message. This scheme uses public quantum keys
to sign message and uses quantum one-time pad to ensure the security
of quantum information on channel. To guarantee the authenticity of
the transmitted quantum states, a family of quantum stabilizer code is
employed. The proposed scheme presents a novel method to construct
secure quantum signature systems for future secure communications.
Key words: Digital signature; Quantum cryptography; Error correc-
tion code; Quantum one-way functions
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography aims at providing information security that relies
on the main properties of quantum mechanics. The most successful topic
of quantum cryptography is quantum key distribution (QKD), which was
firstly invented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1]. QKD is believed to
be the first practical quantum information processor and its unconditional
security has been proven [2,3].
Other than QKD, quantum cryptography protocols are widely studied
in these years, such as quantum digital signature and quantum message
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2authentication. Digital signature is a main task in modern cryptography
and is widely used in today’s communication systems. Digital signature
cares about the “authenticity” data on channel [4]. Informally, an un-
forgeable signature scheme requires that each user be able to efficiently
generate his(her) own signature and verify the validity of another user’s
signature on a specific document, and no one be able to efficiently gen-
erate the signatures of other users to documents that those users didn’t
sign.
Gottesman and Chuang proposed a quantum digital system [5] based
on quantum mechanics, and claimed that the scheme was absolutely
secure, even against an adversary having unlimited computational re-
sources. The scheme, however, can only sign classical bits string and can’t
deal with general quantum superposition states. Zeng presented an arbi-
trated quantum signature scheme, the security of which is due to the
correlation of the GHZ triplet states and utilization of quantum one-time
pad [6].In an arbitrated signature scheme, all communications involve
a so called arbitrator who has access to the contents of the messages
[7]. The security of most arbitrated signature schemes depends heavily
on the trustworthiness of the arbitrators. Zeng’s protocol signs quantum
messages which are known to the signatory. It seems impossible to sign a
general unknown quantum state [5,6,8].
In this paper, we present a novel arbitrated quantum digital signature
scheme which can sign general quantum states, the security of which is
based on a family of quantum one-way functions by quantum information
theory. This article is arranged as below.
Section 2 introduces some definitions and preliminaries we will use in
the article. Section 3 describes the proposed quantum signature scheme.
The security is considered in Section 4. Section 5 gives discussions and
conclusions.
32 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum one-way function
This section introduces a class of quantum one-way functions based on
the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics, which was proposed
by Gottesman and Chuang [5] and the definitions are presented as below.
Definition 1 (quantum one-way function ). A function f : |x〉n1 7→
|f(x)〉n2 where x ∈ Fn12 and n1 ≫ n2, is called a quantum one-way func-
tion under physical mechanics if
(1) Easy to compute: There is a quantum polynomial-time algorithm
A such that on input |x〉 outputs |f(x)〉.
(2) Hard to invert: Given |f(x)〉, it is impossible to invert x by virtue
of fundamental quantum information theory.
What should be pointed out for the above definition is that the con-
dition n1 ≫ n2 is necessary. By Holevo’s theorem [10], no more than
n classical bits of information can be obtained by measuring n qubits
quantum states. Several means to construct quantum one-way function
were introduced by Gottesman and Chuang [5] and here we choose the
quantum fingerprinting function [11] for the candidate. The quantum fin-
gerprinting function of a bit string u ∈ Fw2 is
|f(u)〉 = 1√
m
m∑
l=1
(−1)El(u) · |l〉 (1)
where E : {0, 1}w → {0, 1}m is a family of error correcting code with
fixed c > 1, 0 < δ < 1 and m = cw. El(u) denotes the lth bit of E(u).
The distance between distinct code words E(u1) and E(u2) is at least
(1 − δ)m. Since two distinct code words can be equal in at most δm
positions, for any u1 6= u2 we have 〈f(u1)|f(u2)〉 ≤ δm/m = δ. Here f(u)
can be regarded as a class of quantum one-way functions, which are easy
to compute, but difficult to reverse.
42.2 Quantum stabilizer codes
Quantum error correction code (QECC) is a way of encoding quantum
data (having m qubits) into n qubits (m<n), which protects quantum
states against the effects of noise. Quantum stabilizer code is an impor-
tant class of QECC and has been used to the other subject of quantum
information, such as quantum cryptography [10].
The Pauli operators {±I,±σx,±σy,±σz} constitute a group of order
8. The n-fold tensor products of single qubit Pauli operators also form a
group Gn = ±{I,±σx,±σy,±σz}, of order 22n+1. We refer to Gn as the
n-qubit Pauli group. Let S denote an abelian subgroup of the n-qubit
Pauli group Gn. Then the stabilizer codes HS ⊆ H22n satisfy,
|ψ〉 ∈ HS, iff M |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 for all M ∈ S (2)
The group S is called the stabilizer of the code, since it preserves all
of the codewords.
For stabilizer codes [[n, k, d]], the generators Mi and the errors Ea,
write
MiEa = (−1)SiaEaMi, i = 1, · · · , n− k (3)
The s′ias constitute a syndrome for the error Ea, as (−1)Sia will be
the result of measuring Mi if the error Ea happens. For a nondegenerate
code, s′ias will be distinct for all Ea ∈ ε, so that measuring the n − k
stabilizer generators will diagnose the error completely.
3 The Proposed Protocol
3.1 Security requirements
The proposed scheme is a cryptographic protocol involving three entities:
a signatory Alice, a receiver Bob, and an arbitrator Trent who authen-
ticates and validates the signed message. The security of the signature
scheme depends much on the trustworthiness of the arbitrator who has
access to the contents of the messages. The quantum digital signature
discussed in this article should meet the following security conditions:
51. Each user (Alice) can efficiently generate her own signature on mes-
sages of his choice;
2. A receiver Bob can efficiently verify whether a given string is a signa-
ture of another user’s on specific message with Trent’s help;
3. The signatory can’t disavow the message that she has signed;
4. It is infeasible to produce signatures of other users’ messages they
haven’t signed.
3.2 The protocol
Key generation
1. Key distribution. Alice, Bob and Trent agree on some random bits
KAT , KAB and KTB as their private keys. KAT is shared between
Alice and Trent, KAB is shared between Alice and Bob and KTB
between Trent and Bob .
To ensure that the scheme is unconditionally secure, the keys can
be generated using quantum key distribution protocols, such as BB84
or EPR protocol[1,10].
2. Signature key generation. Alice generates 2k random secret strings
ui,j ∈ Fw2 and computes
|yi,j〉 = |f(ui,j)〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, j ∈ {0, 1} (4)
Here f : |x〉 7→ |f(x)〉 is a class of quantum one-way functions intro-
duced in section 2. Alice generates 4n key pairs of {ui,j, |yi,j〉}1≤i≤2nj∈{0,1}
and then publicly announces {|yi,j〉}1≤i≤2nj∈{0,1} as her public key and keeps
{ui,j}1≤i≤2nj∈{0,1} as her private key.
Signature
1. Suppose Alice has a quantum state |ψ〉 ∈ H2n and wants to send it to
Bob. Alice randomly selects bits strings x ∈ F 2n2 , k for the stabilizer
codes {Qk} and s. She q-encrypts |ψ〉 as ρ using x. Alice encodes ρ
according to Qk with syndromes s and obtains pi.
62. Alice computes
X = (xpre|s| ⊕ y)||(xsuf2n−|s|)1 (5)
and generates four copies of X ′s signature |ΣK(X)〉 according to her
key K ∈ {ui,j , |yi,j〉|1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, j ∈ {0, 1}}
|ΣK(X)〉 = |y1,X1 ⊗ . . .⊗ y2n,X2n〉 = |a1 ⊗ . . .⊗ a2n〉 = |a〉 (6)
Alice sends pi and two copies of |ΣK(X)〉 to Bob. At the same time,
she encrypts {s, k, x} as C1 using KAT 2 and sends C1 and two copies
of |ΣK(X)〉 to Trent. We assume that each setting up of a protocol
has a unique sequence number.
Verification
1. Trent receives C ′1 and two copies of |Σ′K(X)〉 = |a′〉. Trent checks
whether these two copies of |Σ′K(x)〉 he recieved are equivalent by
performing a quantum swap test circuit (QSTC [11]). If any one of
|a′i〉’s fails the test, Trent aborts the protocol. Trent decrypts C ′1 using
his secure keyKAT and obtains {sT , kT , xT }. He computes |ΣK(X)(T )〉
according to xT and Alice’s public keys. Trent compares |ΣK(X)(T )〉 =
|a〉T to |Σ′K(X)〉. If any one of them fails the test, Trent aborts the
protocol. Trent encrypts {kT , xT } as C2 using KTB and sends the
ciphertext to Bob.
The comparison of two quantum states is less straightforward than
in the classical case because of the statistical properties of quantum
measurements. Another serious problem is that quantum measure-
ments usually introduce a noneligible disturbance of the measured
1 Suppose s < 2n in the algorithm. Here, xpre|y| denotes the first |y| bits of x and
xsuf
2n−|y|
denotes the last 2n − |y| bits of x, a ⊕ b means the bit-by-bit XOR of
the strings a and b, namely a ⊕ b = a1 ⊕ b1, · · · , am ⊕ bm. The symbol “||
′′ means
concatenation of two binary strings.
2 In this algorithm, we select classical one-time-pad to encrypt classical message to
ensure the unconditional security.
7state. Here, we use the quantum swap test circuit (QSTC) proposed
in [11] to compare whether |ai〉T and |a′i〉 are equivalent or not. QSTC
is a comparison strategy with one-sided error probability (1 + δ2/2),
and each pair of the compared qubits has an inner product with an
absolute value at most δ. Because there are 2n sets of qubits to be
compared, the error probability of the test can be reduced to (1+δ
2
2 )
2n,
where 〈fi|fj〉 ≤ δ with i 6= j, and n is the security parameter. Let the
number of the incorrect keys be ej , Bob rejects it as invalid signature
if ej > cM . Here c is a threshold for rejection and acceptance in the
protocol.
2. Bob has received Alice’s information [pi′, |Σ′′K(X)〉 = |a′′〉], pi′ and
Trent’s message C ′2 now. He deciphers C
′
2 as {kB , xB} and computes
XB according to Eq.(5). He measures the syndrome sB of the stabilizer
code Qk on pi
′ and decodes the qubits as ρ′. He encrypts sB as C3 using
parts of KTB and sends it to Trent.
3. Trent encrypts sT as C4 using parts of KTB and sends it to Bob.
4. Bob deciphers C ′4 and obtains sT . He compares sB to sT and aborts if
any error is detected. Bob checks whether these two copies of |Σ′′K(X)〉
are equivalent by performing the QSTC. He computes quantum states
|Σ(X)〉B = |a〉B using XB and Alice’s public keys {|yi,j〉}1≤i≤2nj∈{0,1} . He
verifies Alice’s signature according to
VK(XB , |Σ′K(X)〉) = True⇔ {|a′i〉 = |yi,Xi〉 = |a′′i 〉B}1≤i≤2n (7)
Bob q-decrypts ρ′ as |ψ′〉 according to xB .
4 Security Analysis
4.1 Correctness
Theorem 1 (Correctness). Suppose all the entities involved in the scheme
follow the protocol, then Eq. (7) holds.
Proof. The correctness of the scheme can be seen by inspection. In the
absence of intervention, Trent will obtain Alice’s key s, x, k and her sig-
nature of X. Trent verifies the signature and sends x, k secretly to Bob.
8Bob can successfully decode and decipher the quantum states and verify
Alice’s signature. Because Alice signs her message according to Eq. (6),
it’s easy to verify that Eq. (7) holds.
4.2 Security against repudiation
Alice can’t deny her signature. When Alice disavows her signature, Bob
will resort to Trent. Bob sends one copy of the signature |Σ′′K(X)〉 to
Trent. Trent compares sB and |Σ′′K(X)〉 with sT and his kept copy of
signature |Σ′K(X)〉 Alice has sent to him. If all these pass the test, Trent
reveals that Alice is cheating because |ΣK(X)〉 contains Alice’s signature
on her private keys x and s. Otherwise, Trent concludes that the signature
has been forged by Bob or other attackers.
4.3 Security against forgery
Theorem 2. Other entities forge Alice’s signature with a successful prob-
ability at most 2−[(w−t⌈log2m⌉)+2n].
Proof. Considering that an adversary (Eve or Bob) controls the com-
munication channels connecting Alice, Trent and Bob and wants to forger
Alice’s signature. Here we present two strategies that the attack Eve
(Bob) can apply.
1. One is that she tries to alter the signed quantum states. Eve inter-
cepts [pi′, |Σ′K(X)〉]. She keeps pi′ and selects a random key xE to
encrypt another quantum states |φ〉 as τ and sends [τ, |Σ′K(X)〉] to
Bob. Because Eve knows nothing about the stabilizer code {Qk} and
syndrome s, her cheating will be detected by Bob in the fourth step
of the verification phase when he compares the syndrome y to y′.
2. The second strategy is that the attacker tries to recover Alice’s pri-
vate keys and generates a “legal” signature. Because she knows noth-
ing about Alice’s private keys x, y, k,KAT and {ui,j}1≤i≤2nj∈{0,1} . She can’t
compute x, y, k from the mixed state pi′. According to Holevo’s theo-
rem [10], Eve can obtain at most t⌈log2m⌉ bits of classical information
about one of Alice’s signature key {ui,j} from Alice’s public key. Here,
9t is a small natural number and we let c = 4 in our scheme. Since she
lacks w−t⌈log2m⌉ bits of information about any private key which Al-
ice hasn’t revealed, she will only guess correctly at most 2−[w−t⌈log2m⌉]
of it. Therefore, the attacker can forger Alice’s signature only with a
successful probability less than 2−[(w−t⌈log2m⌉)+2n].
5 Concluding Remarks
Designing quantum digital signature protocol is not trivial because of
several fundamental properties of quantum message.
The first and the most important property of quantum information
is the no-clone theorem, which forbids the unknown qubits reproduction.
For digital signature, how can we verify the signature is indeed the signa-
ture on a specific state without generating copies of the original message?
The second is the probability and irreversibility properties of quantum
measurement. That brings much troubles to decide whether a state is a
legal signature without changing that state.
The last property of secure quantum signature scheme is that it is
also a secure encryption scheme, which has been shown by Barnum et al.
in literature [8].
In this article, we investigate how to span these obstacles and present
a quantum digital signature scheme. The security of the scheme relies
on the existence of a family of quantum one-way functions by quantum
principles. The authenticity of the quantum information is obtained by
quantum error correction codes and security of the quantum information
on channel is ensured by quantum one-time pad.
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